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Asymmetry information is a common phenomenon in human society. It is also 
one of the factors that influence the effect of tax collection and administration.  
This thesis studies tax collection and administration from the asymmetry 
information perspective based on the above background. Then analyze the behavior 
of participants with the game theory, and design mechanisms to solve problems 
which caused by asymmetric information.  
This thesis consists of four parts: 
The first part is an introduction. This part mainly introduced the research 
background, research significance, domestic and foreign research asymmetry 
information in the literature review, research methods, technical route, and so on. 
This chapter mainly introduces the domestic and foreign scholars on the theory of 
asymmetry information, as well as the application of information asymmetry theory 
in tax collection and administration. 
The second part is the theoretical framework of this thesis. First of all, the 
author summarized the performance of asymmetric information in tax collection and 
administration. Based on performance analysis, this thesis set up game models for 
related problems. Finally, according to the results of game analysis, the mechanism 
design is proposed.  
The thesis sets up two models to analyze of the behavior strategy between the 
participating parties in the process of tax collection and administration, one model is 
between the tax collectors and tax payers, another one is between the tax collectors 
and third-party intermediaries. According to the results of game analysis, with the 
purpose of regulate the behavior of taxpayers & third-party intermediaries, we must 
make their illegal income cannot make up for potential losses. 
The third part is the empirical analysis. In this part the author summarize three 
performances of asymmetric information in second-hand house transaction tax 













existing measures. The author also described two suggestions which are useful for 
tax collection and administration. According to the analysis results, we can establish 
the positive incentive mechanisms and incentive compatibility mechanism. 
The fourth part is the conclusion and prospect. At first, the studies on the game 
model and empirical analysis are summarized. Then it points out that because of the 
limitation of the model, the research results of this paper remain in policy analysis, 
and the research direction and development trend of this catalyst are proposed, 
which is quantitative analysis of tax collection and management by using the 
repeated game of mix strategy.    
 
 





































目  录 
一、绪论 ..................................................................................................................... 1 
（一）选题背景与研究意义 ............................................................................... 1 
（二）文献综述 ................................................................................................... 3 
（三）研究方法与技术路线 ............................................................................... 8 
（四）创新与不足 ............................................................................................... 9 
二、信息不对称与税收征管：一个理论分析框架 ................................... 11 
（一）税收征管中存在的信息不对称问题 ..................................................... 12 
（二）纯策略博弈分析 ..................................................................................... 15 
（三）相关机制设计 ......................................................................................... 21 
三、以杭州市二手房税收征管为例的实证分析 ........................................ 23 
（一）二手房交易税收介绍 ............................................................................. 23 
（二）杭州市二手房交易税收征管的现状 ..................................................... 27 
（三）存在的信息不对称问题 ......................................................................... 31 
（四）解决相关问题的现有措施与不足 ......................................................... 33 
（五）相关措施建议 ......................................................................................... 37 
四、结论与展望 ..................................................................................................... 40 
（一）主要研究结论 ......................................................................................... 40 
（二）研究的局限性与后续研究建议 ............................................................. 41 
参考文献 ................................................................................................................... 42 



















I. Introduction ...........................................................................................1 
(I) Research Background and Significance ......................................................... 1 
(II) Literature Revie............................................................................................... 3 
(III) Research Methods and Technique Routes ................................................... 8 
(IV) Innovation and Deficiency ............................................................................. 9 
II. The Theoretical Analyzing Framework: Asymmetry Information 
& Tax Collection and Administration ................................................... 11 
(I) Asymmetric Information Problems in Tax Collection and Administration 
 ...................................................................................................................................... 12 
(II) Pure Strategy Game Mode ........................................................................... 15 
(III) Mechanism Design ....................................................................................... 21 
III. Empirical Analysis of the Tax Collection and Administration of 
Second-hand Housing Transactions in Hangzhou City ...................... 23 
(I) Introduction of Second-hand Housing Transaction Tax  ........................... 23 
(II) Current Situation of Tax Collection and Administration of Second-hand 
Housing Transactions in Hangzhou .......................................................................... 27 
(III) Asymmetric Information Problems............................................................ 31 
(IV) Existing Solutions and Shortages ............................................................... 33 
(V) Recommendations ......................................................................................... 37 
IV. Conclusion and Prospect  ............................................................... 40 
(I) Main research conclusions ............................................................................. 40 
(II) Insufficiency and Future Research Direction ............................................. 41 
Bibliography   ....................................................................................... 42 
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